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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellant, 
-v.-





APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
WHETHER SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD 
BY THE STATE IN I'TS PROPRIETARY OR GOVERN-
MENTAL CAPACITY. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A 
RESERVATION OF MINERALS. 
POINT III. 
WHETHER UTAH LAW CONTROLS THE CON-
STRUCTION AND EFFECT TO BE GIVE·N TO UTAH 
STATUTES AND THE AUTHORITY OR LACK OF AU-
THORITY OF STATE OFFICERS. 
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POINT IV. 
WHETHER EXCHANGES NEED NOT BE OF 
EQUIVALENT ESTATES BUT ONLY OF EQUIVALENT 
VALUES. 
POINT V. 
WHETHER A RULE OF PROPERTY CAN BE 
EVOLVED FROM PRIOR EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHETHER SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD 
BY THE STATE IN ITS PROPRIETARY OR GOVERN-
MENTAL CAPACITY. 
In its initial brief, the appellant, State of Utah, in 
reliance upon pertinent provisions of the State Consti-
tution as interpreted in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 
Utah 418, 199 Pac. 670, asserts that school section lands 
such as involved in this case are held by the state in trust 
in its governmental capaci(c Respondents·· reply n1akes 
the contrary contention that such lands are held by the 
state in it~ proprietary capacit~~. The only authority 
cited by respondents in support of their position is 
Strand v. State, 16 "\Vash. ~d 107, 132 P. ~d 1011, where 
it was stated in a suit against the state to quiet title to 
certain "attached tidelands" that the "accepted rule is 
that a state acts in its proprietary capacity when it un-
dertakes to dispose of public lands" of that type. 
-whatever the rule in \Vashington n1ay be with re-
spect to "attached tidelands,'' that state follows a very 
different rule with respect to school section lands. 
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O'Brien v. Wilson, 51 Wash. 52, 97 Pac. 1115; State v. 
City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 602, 107 Pac. 827, Gustaven-
son v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303, 145 Pac. 458. The foregoing 
cases constitute the settled law of Washington with 
respect to school section lands held by the state in its 
governmental capacity. In fact, O'Bri'en v. Wilson, supra., 
was cited and relied upon by this Court in announcing 
the same rule for Utah in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 
supra. 
The two United States Supreme Court cases cited 
by respondents, United States v. California & Oregon 
Land Co., 148 U.S. 31, 13 Sup. Ct. 458, and Uniited States 
v. Dallas Military Road Company, 148 U.S. 49, 13 Sup. 
Ct. 465, are both lifted from the Strand case. The cases 
concern technical rulings with respect to the sufficiency 
of pleadings; they in no way involved the subject of 
school sections or the issue of whether the government 
was acting in its governmental capacity. When the in-
terest of the United States in lands claimed by it in its 
governmental capacity has been challenged, the United 
States Supreme Court has not hesitated to declare that 
such lands are immune from attack based upon principles 
of laches, estoppel, adverse possession, or negligence of 
government agents. As stated in the famous "tidelands 
litigation," United States v. State of Californ~a, 332 U.S. 
19, 39-40, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1669 : 
" ... And even assuming that Government 
agencies have been negligent in failing to recog-
nize or assert the claims of the Government at 
an earlier date, the great interests of the Govern-
ment in this ocean area are not to be forfeited as 
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a result. The Government, which holds its interests 
here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is 
not to be deprived of those interests by the or-
dinary court rules designed particularly for pri-
vate disputes over individually owned pieces of 
property; and officers who have no authority at 
all to dispose of Government property cannot by 
their conduct cause the Government to lose its 
valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or 
failure to act.'' 
Cf. also Hanks v. Lee, 57 Utah 537, 195 Pac. 302. 
The suggestion by respondents that there exists 
some distinction between a state acting in a proprietary 
rather than governmental capacity, when "disposing" of 
property is without warrant. No authority is cited for 
such a "hat changing" proposition and none exists. Since 
its pronouncement by Judge Thurman in 1921, the Van 
Wagoner decision has been and remains the law of Utah 
on this iinportant subject. It has signficant implications 
in the case at bar. If, as the respondents admit, the State 
of Utah owned the school section here involved, then 
no unauthorized acts or negligent conduct on the part of its 
agents, nor any principle of estoppel or laches, could 
preclude the state fr01n asserting its title. Here, the 
state officials had authority in 1925 to conv-ey only the 
surface rights to the school section involved. By virtue 
of an express provision of the rtah law (65-1-15, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953), the 1nineral deposits were re-
served to the State of Utah. Any atten1pt by state offi-
cials to act contrary to this prohibition would be ineffect-
ive to bind the sovereign state with respect to lands held 
in its govern1nental capacity. 
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POINT II. 
WHETHER THE UTAH STATUTES RE:QUIRE A. 
RES:ERV ATION OF MINERALS. 
The State Constitution, Article XX, Section 1, 
specifies that state lands held in trust are to be dis-
posed of only "as may be provided by law." It becomes 
pertinent, therefore, to inquire as to what law or laws the 
state officials purported to act under in entering into 
the exchange transaction with respect to the land in-
volved in this case, title to which had vested in the state. 
Appellant suggests that Sections 65-1-27, 65-1-70 and 
65-1-14 and 65-1-17 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
constitute the only possible grants of authority. It is 
further suggested that in view of their terms and history 
it is unlikely and illogical to assume that either Section 
65-1-27 or Section 65-1-70 is applicable. The authority of 
the State Land Board probably stems from Section 65-
1-14 and 65-1-17. Regardless of the correctness or incor-
rectness of appellant's analysis of these four statutes 
and regardless of which may contain the necessary 
grant of power to enter into an exchange transaction, 
Section 65-1-15 constitutes an unqualified reservation 
in the state of all mineral deposits, and is a complete 
bar to any attempt to alienate such minerals except as 
authorized. 
In their reply brief, the respondents do not attempt 
an analysis of the pertinent statutory provisions, but 
simply brush aside the appellant's argument as "tedious 
and meticulous detail." Instead, respondents broadly 
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assert that Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 are implementary 
to the federal statutes, 43 U.S.C. Sections 851 and 852. 
It may well be that to some extent Section 65-1-27 
is implementary to federal legislation applicable to lieu 
selections. But on its face it is clear that Section 65-1-27 
has nothing to do with exchanges of vested school sec-
tions, since the power of the land board is specifically 
limited to relinquishing to the United States tracts of 
land erroneously listed to the state and tracts upon which 
a bona fide claim had been initiJated by an actual settler. 
School section lands, title to which is vested in the state, 
are clearly outside both of the specified categories. No 
claim is even made by respondents that the subject land 
was erroneously listed or that such land was the subject 
of a bona fide claim by an actual settler. With respect 
to 65-1-70, it is obvious that the exchange therein con-
templated is one between the state and a proprietor other 
than the United States. At the time of the exchange 
transaction involved in this case, 65-1-70 provided that 
"no exchange shall be made by the land board until a 
patent for the land so received in exchange shall have 
been issued by the government of the United States to 
such proprietors or their grantors." In the 1933 Revised 
Statutes, the phrase "b:r the government of the United 
States'' was deleted. Appellant agrees with respondents, 
however, that this deletion did not change the sense of 
the statute. Plainly. the word "proprietors'' in the present 
day version of the statute n1eans someone other than 
the United States, just as it did in 1925 and when the 
:-;tatute was first enacted in 1897. 
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Section 65-1-15 is unqualified in its reservation of 
minerals in lands belonging to the state. The first sen-
tence of the statute is all inclusive. It states: "All coal 
and other mineral deposited in lands belonging to the 
state of Utah are hereby reserved to the state." Respond-
ents contend that this unqualified reservation is limited 
by the second sentence of the statute which reads: "Such 
deposits are reserved from sale, except on a rental 
and royalty basis as herein provided, and the purchaser 
of any lands belonging to the state shall acquire no right, 
title or interest in or to such deposits, but the rights 
of such purchaser shall be subject to the reservation ... " 
Respondents argue that the first sentence is limited and 
restricted by the second sentence, so that the state's 
mineral reservation is applicable only to "sales" in the 
strictest sense of that term. 
Such a self-defeating construction destroys the 
sense and intent of the statute. Do respondents seriously 
contend that the legislature meant to create in one sen-
tence an unqualified reservation of minerals in state 
owned lands, and in the next sentence restrict the reser-
vation to "sales" in the narrowest sense of that term 1 
To do so would defeat the clear intent of the legislature 
to create an unqualified mineral reservation in state 
owned lands. Respondents cite as authority for their 
argument Bird & J ex Company, et al., v. Funk, et al., 
96 Utah 450, 85 P. 2d 831, which deals with the question 
of whether a proviso in the Liquor Control Act per-
rniting advertising of light beer under regulation by the 
Commission modified a general prohibition in the Act 
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forbidding the advertising of all alcoholic beverages, 
including light beer. This Court held that the proviso 
had no such modifying effect, and that the general prohi-
bition of the statute remained intact. The citation stands 
for exactly the reverse of the proposition for which re-
spondents contend and for which they presumably cite 
the case. See also in this connection Dunn v. Bryan, 77 
Utah 604, 608, 299 Pac. 253, 254, where this Court rejected 
a similar argument, stating : 
"We are not impressed with these conclusions, 
nor the argument which attempts to sustain it. 
In order to determine the meaning of this pro-
viso, we must resort to the ordinary rules of con-
struction, and, when these rules are applied, the 
legislative intent is reasonably clear. 
" 'It is a cardinal rule of construction that 
significance and effect shall, if possible, be ac-
corded to every section, clause, word or part of 
the act.' 
" 'The several provisions of the statute should 
be construed together in the light of the general 
purpose and object of the act and so as to give 
effect to the 1nain intent and purpose of the 
legislature as therein expressed.' '' 
In point of fact, the second sentence of Section 65-1-15 
is plainly not a proviso, but is supple1nentary to the gen-
eral mineral re~ervation in the first sentence of the 
statute. It declares that the 1nineral deposits reserved 
in the t'tate an' subject to transfer on a rental and 
royalty basis. Thj~ in no way constitutes a n1odification 
of tlw p;<'nPra I 8weep of the mineral reservation set forth 
in 1he first sentence. 
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As indicated in appellant's initial brief, the word 
"sale" in the statute must be read as synonymous with 
the word "disposition'' and necessarily includes a reser-
vation of minerals in the disposition or exchange of any 
state owned lands. Section 65-1-15 should be construed as 
in pari materia with Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17. Sec-
tion 65-1-14 confers broad powers on the State Land 
Board to direct, manage, and control all state owned 
lands and to "sell" such lands for the best interests of 
the state, while Section 65-1-17 states that surface rights 
may be "sold" in lands subject to a mineral reservation. 
Appellant submits that Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17 
rather than 65-1-27 or 6·5-1-70 are the particular statutes 
which authorize the State Land Board to enter into ex-
change transactions with the federal government. In 
Sections 65-1-14, 65-1-15 and 65-1-17 the words "sell" or 
"sale" or "sold" should be read to include an "exchange." 
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 
Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridgforth v. Middleton, et al., 
184 Miss. 632, 186 So. 837. 
" ... 'Sale' and 'exchange' are used inter~ 
changeably in the law, and as a transmutation of 
property from one party to another in considera-
tion of some price or recompense in value .... " 
Berger v. U.S. Steel Corp., 63 N.J. E. 809, 53 At. 
68, 71. 
Respondents argue that the House Journal of the 
Utah State Legislature for 1919 furnishes support for 
its contention that Section 65-1-15 must be strictly 
limited to the sale of public lands to private individuals. 
A report made by a Special·Committee on Investigation, 
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page 469 of the House Journal, discusses auditing irre-
gularities in the State Land Department, and particularly 
refers to abuses in the sale of public lands for insuffi-
cient consideration. It recommends among other things 
that all sales of public land be suspended for five years. 
The report contains no discussion nor any suggestion or 
recommendation with respect to a mineral reservation 
on the part of the state. Aside from the coincidence that 
the report and the enactment of Section 65-1-15 were 
made in the same year, there appears to be no connection 
between the two events. The report sheds no light upon 
the intent or meaning of Section 65-1-15. 
The appellant has made diligent search to ascertain 
the legislative history of Section 65-1-15 in the hope of 
finding some materials which might be helpful to a 
resolution of the issues in this case. With one exception, 
this research has not disclosed anything of value. The 
exception is a notation in the 1919 Senate Journal re-
ferring to the mineral reservation ~-\_ct. The original bill 
was S.B. No. 58 "an act amending Sections 5575 and 5600, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917. and adding new Sections 
to be known as 5575, 5575Xl, 5575X2, 5575X3, through 
5575X8, relating to the control and management, sales, 
leasing, occupying and using of state lands, and the reser-
vations of 1ninerals in state lands and leasing of 1nineral 
deposit-8. ete." (Senate Journal 1919, p. 126). On page 
267 of the Senate Journal is the following notation: 
"Conunittee on Publie Affairs recmnmends 
Bill for passage - with certain amendments. 
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1. on p. 2 beginning on line 7 strike out the fol-
lowing words: 'except as otherwise expressly 
authorized by law.' '' 
Although the appellant has not been able to locate 
a copy of the original bill, the Session Laws of Utah, 1919, 
Chapter 107, page 302, probably sets forth the bill as 
finally enacted in approximately the same format as the 
original bill. Lines 7 and 8, page 2 of the bill as enacted 
and set forth in the Session Laws, contain the first 
sentence of the mineral reservation statute reading: 
"All coal and other mineral deposits in lands belonging 
to the state are hereby reserved to the state." Undoubt-
edly, the stricken phrase "except as otherwise expressly 
authorized by law" was a modifying clause originally in-
serted at the end of the first sentence of the statute above 
quoted. If such were the case, as seems quite certain, 
the striking of the phrase "except as otherwise expressly 
authorized by law" from the general reservation of all 
mineral deposits in the state, makes crystal clear that the 
legislature intended no exceptions to or limitations upon 
its general reservation. 
The respondents argue that there can be no implied 
reservation in favor of a grantor of lands. Concededly, 
such is the applicable rule with respect to conveyances 
between private individuals. The terms of the conveyance 
generally control the extent of the grant. But the situa-
tion in the case at bar is entirely different. Here certain 
officials of the State of Utah purported to convey a state 
owned school section to the federal government without 
specifying a mineral reservation as expressly required 
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12 
by existing state law. Can state officials, without author-
ity so to do, thus convey to another mineral rights in 
a school section held in trust by the state in its govern-
mental capacity~ Assume there existed a state statute 
stating in precise terms that "the State Land Board is 
hereby prohibited from making any exchange of state 
owned school sections with the L nited States, without 
an express mineral reservation." Under such circum-
stances, would the respondents argue that in the very 
teeth of such a statute, state officials could convey the 
fee simple title to designated school sections to the Uni-
ted States~ Under such circumstances would the United 
States contend that the State of Ltah had "waived" 
its rights to the minerals~ The mere statement of these 
queries provides their own answer. Although no statute 
as precise as that assumed is set forth in the 17tah laws, 
Section 65-1-15 has exactly the same legal effect. It con-
stitutes an express liJ.nitation upon the power of state 
officials to act. If the officials attempt to act in deroga-
tion of that authorit~-, their action cannot be binding 
upon the state. 
The provision of -1:3 1J.S.C. §851 that the "selection of 
lands in lieu thereof by the state or territory shall be a 
waiver of its right to said sections .. 1nay be operative as 
far as the federal goYerninent is concerned: it certainly 
cannot bind the stah• so as to require a \YaiYer of its 
rights when agents of the state aet in derogation of their 
statutor~- authority. ~tah• la\\- and state law only can 
control thP t<'nns and conditions under which state lands 
held in a governmental capacity can be conveyed. State 
of California v. neserct TT7ater, Oil & J:rri'[!ation Company. 
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243 U.S. 415, 37 Sup. Ct. 394; United States v. Burnison, 
339 U.S. 87, 70 Sup. Ct. 503. The federal statutes ( 43 
U.S.C. §§ 851 and 852) can be no more than permissive. 
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, supra. 
Any other view would invade powers expressly reserved 
to the State of Utah under the Tenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
Respondents cite Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1927, 
and Chapter 144, Laws of Utah, 1957. Both statutes in-
volve an authorization to transfer certain public lands 
owned by the state to the federal government, with an 
express mineral reservation. According to respondents, 
these statutes demonstrate a contemporaneous construc-
tion by the legislature of Section 65-1-15, since the 
statutes contain an express reservation of minerals and 
do not rely upon the general reservation contained in 
65-1-15. With equal plausibility, it could be argued that 
the statutes emphasize the legislature's fixed intention, 
consistent with the policy declared in 65-1-15, to reserve 
minerals in the state in connection with the transfer of 
any public lands to the United States. The transfer in 
1925 of the surface rights to the school section here in-
volved required no special statute in view of Sections 
65-1-14 and 65-1-17, but the all inclusive mineral reserva-
tion contained in Section 65-1-15 obviously applied. 
Moreover, in Laws of Utah, 1937, Chapter 149, an act 
authorizing the relinquishment to the United States of 
certain lands in Bryce Canyon, it was expressly provided 
that the conveyance would include the mineral rights. 
On respondents' theory, it could be argued that this indi-
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cates that only when there exists a statute expressly au-
thorizing transfer of minerals to the United States will 
the state be deemed to have departed from its established 
policy of reserving all mineral deposits. 
POINT III. 
WHETHER UTAH LAW CONTROLS THE CON-
STRUCTION AND EFFECT TO BE GIVEN TO UTAH 
STATUTES AND THE AUTHORITY OR LACK OF AU-
THORITY OF STATE OFFICERS. 
A certain amount of confusion has developed in this 
case with respect to the specific issues said to be con-
trolled by Utah law. Respondents' brief fails to delineate 
these issues : 
1. What is the construction and effect to be given 
to Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and the earlier enactments from which it was 
derived~ 
2. Was that statute intended to reserve minerals 
to the State of Utah in vested school lands in an 
exchange with the United States of America1 
3. Did the e1nployees and officers of the State of 
Utah who entered into the exchange transactions 
have authority to convey or waive the minerals 
in vested school lands Y 
Appellant sub1nits that the foregoing questions are 
controlled by Utah state law and that only a decision 
by this Court can be finally dispositive thereof. 
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No attempt is made by respondents to distinguish or 
explain any of the authorities set forth in appellant's 
initial brief, except the case of Newton v. State BO'ard 
of Land Commissioners) et al.J 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053. 
An effort is made to distinguish the Newton case on the 
grounds that the State of Idaho had organic provisions 
prohibiting exchanges. A careful reading of the Newton 
decision will show that it cannot be distinguished on this 
ground. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the State 
Board of Land ·Commissioners lacked authority under 
Section 5 of the Idaho Admission Bill and under Section 
8, Article IX of the Idaho Constitution to effect the con-
templated exchange. It obviously makes no difference 
whether the prohibition is contained in the state consti-
tution or in state statutes. If the prohibition exists, the 
agents and officers of the state lack authority to effect 
an exchange. The Newton case was commenced in the 
Supreme Court of Idaho to prohibit the State Board of 
Land Commissioners from making an exchange of school 
lands with the United States. Petitioner alleged that the 
State Board lacked authority under state law to effect 
such an exchange on the terms proposed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the question was one of state 
law and that such authority did not exist. In so holding, 
the court carefully reviewed and considered California 
v. Deseret Water) Oil and Irrigation Company) 243 U.S. 
415, 37 Sup. Ct. 394, characterizing that decision as fol-
lows: 
" ... But as we understand the decision, the 
Federal Supreme Court expressly disavows any 
purpose to decide for the state when and under 
what circumstances it has authority under its Con-
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stitution and laws to surrender such school lands, 
which is the question before us for determination. 
* :JI: *" 
Other portions of the Newton opinion are set forth in 
appellant's prior brief. 
In adition to the authorities previously cited, the 
following additional citations hold that state law is con-
trolling with respect to land litigation: 
Brine v. Insurance Company, 96 e.S. 627, 24 L.E. 
858 
Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat 577 
McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall23 
Johanson v. W ashi11gton, 190 U.S. 179, 23 Sup. Ct. 
825 
Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557 
Tyler v. Uni,ted States, 281 r.S. 497. 50 Sup. Ct. 
356 
United States v. Burnison, 339li.S. 87,70 Sup. Ct. 
503 
United States v. E. H. Kramel, et al., :234 F. 2d 577 
(8th Cir. 1956) 
Hidalgo County TFater Control and lmprorement 
District No. 7, et al. v. Wyatt C. Hedrick, et al., 
226 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1955) 
Humble Oil and Refining Company v. Sun Oil 
Company, 190 F. :2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951) 
Respondents argue that "the applicable federal legis-
lation" controls to the t•xelusion of state statutes. No 
identification is 1nade of the particular federal statutes 
deemed applieable. It would appear. however, from the 
discut-'Hion at page 1:2 of respondents' brief that their con-
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tention is that Section 851, Title 43, United States Code,. 
controls to the exclusion of state law. Followed to its 
logic conclusion, respondents' argument is that Section 
851, Title 43 operates to provide that the action of stat~ 
officers, in making a selection, constitutes a waiver of 
state's rights, notwithstanding lack of authority under 
state statutes. 
This contention is a far-reaching proposition which 
cannot withstand analysis. As evidenced by the numerous 
authorities cited by appellant, the Congress of the United 
States has no authority to legislate with respect to when 
and under what circumstances a state, acting in its gov-
ernmental capacity, may waive its rights in real property. 
Congress has no power to vest authority in state officers 
and employees to perform acts which are not authorized 
under state law. There is no provision in the Constitution 
of the United States granting such powers to Congress. 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States expressly provides that all powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited 
by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively 
or to the people. It is this basic constitutional concept 
which through the years has brought about a consistent 
determination by federal and state courts that questions 
such as those involved in this action are controlled by 
state law. 
The statement is made by respondents at page 17 
of their brief that the executive and legislative officers 
of the State of Utah at no time material to these pro-
cedings believed that implementing and consensual legis-
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lation ·was not in existence~ Except for· the ommission of 
any mention of a mineral reservation in the Selection 
Lists, there is not a single shred of evidence in this case 
which would indicate that any officer of the State of Utah 
intended to convey the mineral rights in the subject 
lands to the United States. Even if such an erroneous 
belief had been held by an officer of the State, such a 
belief, if in fact contrary to the provisions of the Utah 
statutes, could have no binding effect upon the State of 
Utah. 
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 71 Sup. Ct. 557, cited at 
page 18, of respondents' brief is not in point. That case 
involved an interstate compact between eight states to 
control polution in the Ohio River system. The compact 
required congressional consent, and direct participation 
by the federal government was provided by the Presi-
dent's appointment of three 1nembers of the compact com-
mission. The Ohio River is an interstate stream which 
directly affects interstate conrmerce. The Constitution 
of the United States expressly provides in Article 1, 
Section 8, that Congress shall have power to regulate 
commerce among the several states. ~\rticle 1, Section 
10 of the Constitution of the United States provides that 
no state shall; without the consent of Congress, enter 
into any agreement or emnpact with another state. The 
<~ontrolling effect given to federal law in Dyer v. Sims 
was obviously predicated upon the foregoing considera-
tion~. But application of federalla.w to a 1nultistate com-
pact concerning an interstate strean1 is an entirely differ-
Put matter from deter1nining the law applicable to land 
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transactions within a state. As recognized by Justice 
Reed in his concurring opinion, at page 32 and 33, 341 
u.s. 22: 
" ... This Court must accept the State court's 
interpretation of its own Constitution unless it is 
prepared to say that the interpretation is a pal-
pable evasion to avoid a federal rule." 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER E:X:CHANGE8 NEED NOT BE OF 
EQUIVALENT ESTATES BUT ONLY OF EQUIVALENT 
VALUES. 
Respondents' argument under this point assumes 
two propositions: 
1. That federal exchanges must be of equivalent 
estates and that an exchange of equivalent estates 
was lacking in the subject transaction; and, 
2. That if an exchange of equivalent estates was 
required, then the mineral rights in the subject 
lands passed from the State of Utah to the 
United States of America. 
Neither of these propositions is a correct statement 
of the law. There is no provision in Section 851, Title 43, 
United States Code, which requires that the exchange be 
one of equivalent estates, nor is there any express pro-
vision contained in that statute which requires a convey-
ance by a state of mineral rights in lands the title to 
which already has vested in a state. Furthermore, it is 
significant that not a single decision or statute has been 
cited by respondents for the proposition that a state can-
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not reserve minerals in making an exchange. The Regu-
lations of the Department of Interior relating to 
exchanges under Section 851 (Code of Federal Regula-
tions, Section 270.3, Title 43), provides only that the 
lands selected correspond in area with the base tract. 
Although the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 
489, 41 Sup. Ct. 393, suggests that the Act contemplates an 
exchange of equivalents, it does not hold that the ex-
change must be one of equivalent estates. 
The entire statutory and regulatory scheme of Con-
gress and the Department of the Interior, as the same 
pertains to exchanges of land by the United States, con-
templates an exchange of equivalent values, not an ex-
change of equivalent estates. A reading of the various 
exchange statutes of the United States and the Regula-
tions of the Department of the Interior promulgated pur-
suant thereto makes evident that the general practice 
in exchanges of all types has been to look to the value 
of the interests exchanged, rather than to equivalent es-
tates. 
In that connection, it is interesting to note the situa-
tion \Vith respect to particular exchanges covered by the 
federal statutes and regulations. 
Provision was 1nade in the Aet of June S. 1934, 48 
Stat. 272, popularly known as the Taylor Grazing Act, 
for the exchange of land by the United States with pri-
vate proprietors and "·ith the states. The statute itself 
provides that either party 1nay reserve 1nineral rights, 
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easements or other rights of use. The regulations (Section 
146.2 and 147.4, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43) 
provide simply that the exchange must be of equivalent 
values. 
Provision was made in the Act of March 20, 1922, 
42 Stat. 465, 16 U.S.C. 485, for exchanges of land with 
the United States of America for the consolidation or ex-
tension of national forests. The Act expressly provides 
that mineral rights can be reserved by either party. The 
Regulations of the Department of Interior (Section 148.5, 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43) provide that 
the exchange be of equivalent values. 
The Act of June 15, 1926, 44 Stat. 7 46, provides for 
exchanges by the United States with the State of New 
Mexico to obtain lands for national forests. This statute 
expressly permits reservation of mineral, timber or 
easements. The Regulations of the Department Interior 
(Section 148.23, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43) 
require that the value of selected lands shall not exceed 
the value of offered lands, taking into account any 
reservations. 
Each of the other exchange statutes and the 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, contemplates 
an exchange, not of equivalent estates, but of equivalent 
values. It is apparent, therefore, that there is no provision 
of federal law which requires an exchange of equivalent 
estates. 
Respondents' argument assumes that if an exchange 
of equivalent estates was required under federal statute, 
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that in that event the minerals passed out of the State of 
Utah, notwithstanding any prohibition contained in the 
Utah statutes. Even assuming that the federal laws 
required an exchange of equivalent estates, such a re-
quirement would provide no authority under state law 
for a conveyance of the mineral rights in vested school 
lands. 
Respondents concede on page 20 of their brief that 
the federal government followed a consistent practice 
in connection with exchanges under Section 851, Title 
43, of either reserving the mineral rights in selected lands 
or determining in advance of the approval of exchanges 
that the selected lands had no mineral value. If federal 
law required an exchange of equivalents, how can the 
respondents justify the practice followed by the federal 
governn1ent over the years f How can the exchanges 
be "of equivalents" if the United States either reserved 
the minerals or gave up land having no mineral value, 
unless "equivalents" refers to approximate values rather 
than estates. 
It is significant to note that in exchanges under 
Section 851, Title 43, between the State of Utah and the 
United States pertaining to lands which were included 
in the addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation after 
May 12, 1919, approval was given by the United States 
of Amer:iea to approxin1atel~· 31 separate approved lists. 
Of said 31 approved lists there were 9 lists in which either 
all or part of the selected or lieu lands were exchanged 
with express reservation in the United States of America . 
of tnineral rights. In all instances where an express 
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reserva ton of minerals was not made by the United 
States with respect to the lieu lands, a determination 
was made prior to the exchange that the lands had 
no mineral value. If respondents' contentions are correct, 
the State of Utah in many instances gave up its rights 
to the minerals in the school lands included in said ex-
changes and, in turn, received lieu lands which were either 
determined to have no mineral value or in which the 
United States expressly reserved such minerals. 
POINT V. 
WHETHER A RULE OF PROPERTY CAN BE 
EVOLVED FROM PRIOR EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS. 
Appellant recognizes that there have been a large 
number of exchange transactions between the State of 
Utah and the federal government. Although the record 
in this case is silent as to the number of acres of land 
involved in such transactions, the number does not even 
closely approximate the 1,000,000 acres suggested by 
respondents. Furthermore, respondents have referred to 
transactions involving all of the different types of ex-
changes which have been entered into by the State of 
Utah. It is of no assistance in this case to look to trans-
actions of an unlike character. 
The great bulk of the exchanges referred to by re-
spondents relate to lands where title had not vested in 
the State of Utah. Appellant concedes that the minerals 
were not reserved in lands where title had not vested 
in the State prior to the exchange. The mineral reserva-
tion contained in Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 
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1953, relates only to lands owned by or belonging to the 
State of Utah. Transactions involving lands which never 
vested have no significance. It is also important to de-
termine what part of the exchanges involving vested 
lands occurred after the effective date of Section 65-1-15. 
Obviously there was no statutory prohibition against 
a conveyance of the mineral rights prior to the effective 
date of May 12, 1919. If such a classification of exchanges 
were made, it is probable that there would not be found 
many instances where the precise type of exchange in-
volved in this action has occurred. It is safe to say that 
the number would not approach anywhere near the di-
mensions indicated by respondents. 
Respondents do not suggest what rule of property 
is to be evolved from the exchange transactions, although 
the reference on page 22 of their brief indicates that the 
rule of property proposed is the "equivalent estate 
principle." As hereinabove demonstrated, no such rule 
exists. 
The suggestion is n1ade that an estoppel may arise 
against the State of lTtah out of said transactions, even 
though the state acted in its govermnental capacit~~ where 
necessary to prevent loss and the perpetration of a fraud 
and such estoppel would not in1pair tl1e exercise of 
sovereign power. This broad statenwnt is n1eaningless 
in the eontext of the facts of this case. ~-\.ppellant has 
<dread~· di~enssed the law relating to estoppel. It is re-
spectfully ~ubmitted that this Court n1ust disregard its 
prior decisions in order to adopt an estoppel theory in 
this ea.~P. Apart from that consideration, there certainly 
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is no evidence of fraud in this case, and the application 
of an estoppel theory here would clearly impair the exer-
cise of the state's sovereign powers. 
Even if a theory of estoppel were applicable, it 
would be necessary for respondents to show proof of the 
elements of an estoppel. Such proof is entirely lacking 
in this case. Respondents do not even suggest the type 
of estoppel claimed, whether estoppel by record, estoppel 
by deed or estoppel by matter in pais. The failure of re-
spondents to offer any evidence or proof of the elements 
of an estoppel or to treat the subject in an analytical 
legal fashion by suggesting the type of estoppel and the 
elements thereof, suggests that their argument is not 
made with any serious conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondents' brief fails to meet or answer the 
arguments set forth in appellant's opening brief. Appel-
lant submits that, in fact, there is no logical answer to 
the arguments which support the position of the State of 
Utah. For this reason, this Court respectfully is asked 
to reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judg-
ment for the appellant quieting the title of the State of 
Utah to the mineral deposits in the lands here involved. 
Respectfully, 
E. R. oCALLISTER, JR., 
Attorney General, 
State of Utah 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
Special Assistant 
Counsel for Appellant 
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